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An eminent physicist was asked by his daughter, an under-
graduate, for advice on the choice of a field for graduate study. 
"You don't have quite a tough enough mind for the hard sci-
ences," he responded. "You have too tough a mind for the soft 
sciences. I think you're just about right for law." It turned out, 
fortunately, to be a happy choice. But notably missing was any 
reference to the humanities; they were evidently off the map alto-
gether. Might the father have prefaced his advice to study law by 
observing, "you have a strong background in the humanities"? 
Asked to describe the relation of the humanities to the law, or 
to the Constitution in particular, most respondents would venture 
a rather condescending, twofold answer: the humanities serve to 
make legal practitioners and interpreters more civilized, and fur-
nish decorative tags that can be attached, like colored streamers 
on a car, to judgments that have already arrived at their destina-
tion. Although neither function is entirely unworthy, taken to-
gether their superficiality is complete: the one too amorphous, the 
other too fragmentary. 
To become more civilized (Justice Holmes's sole prescription 
for our social ills)-to reflect sensitively on life and joy, death and 
suffering, destiny and chance, the common and the unique, the 
good and the good-for-enlarges the understanding of the physi-
cian, the journalist, and the factory foreman no less than that of 
the constitutional lawyer or judge. To feel as well as to know-or 
rather, to sense that to know deeply we must imagine that which 
we profess to know-is an imperative whether the object of our 
knowledge is coal mining or the Bill of Rights. 
Pinning historical and literary tags on constitutional argu-
ments is frequently no more than a rhetorical flourish, innocent 
enough unless it deludes the reader by being more powerful than 
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its probative force warrants, or unless it reflects self-delusion on 
the part of the author. Plucking historical or literary nuggets is 
like looking over a crowd to find one's friends, which is how 
Santayana described the effort to derive one's moral values from a 
perusal of modern history. 
Still, the telling allusion may provide a genuine flash of in-
sight, and the temptation to use it may be irresistible. I confess to 
having done so, not in entire shamefacedness, for example draw-
ing on Measure for Measure when questioning the virtue of loy-
alty investigations: "There's scarce truth enough alive to make 
societies secure; but security enough to make fellowships ac-
cursed." Or drawing on Wordsworth when voices are raised say-
ing that God has been driven out of the public schoolrooms along 
with ritual prayer: "Dear child, dear girl, that walkest with me 
here,/ If thou appear untouched by solemn thought/Thy nature is 
not therefore less divine./Thou liest in Abraham's bosom all the 
year,/ And worship'st at the Temple's inner shrine,/ God being 
with thee when we know it not." 
These, then, are the limbs and outward flourishes of the hu-
manities as they touch the fringes of the process of apprehending 
the Constitution. The heart and soul of constitutional under-
standing takes us to the more central concerns of the humanistic 
disciplines. 
The Constitution is a fundamental document. Its elaboration 
through laws and decisions raises fundamental questions of mean-
ing and the meaning of meaning. There is indeed an ongoing de-
bate on the issue of whether an understanding of the Constitution 
is essentially a matter of interpreting its language to produce re-
sults that we think the framers would have reached, or taking ac-
count of the values implicit in its premises and structure, or 
incorporating into its spacious clauses the values most significant 
today. The issue is easily recognizable as a basic and subtle one in 
philosophy, history, and literature, and even in the higher reaches 
of science. "I don't think he discovered the nucleus of the atom," 
a colleague remarked of Ernest Rutherford, "I think he put it 
there." The proper approach will differ from one discipline to an-
other, and from one sector to another within a single discipline. It 
is not possible to explore the appropriate differences here. In law 
itself the "meaning" of a bequest in a last will and testament 
means something different from the "meaning" of due process of 
law in the Constitution. To confound the two would be akin to 
reading Hamlet as just another Elizabethan revenge play. To 
fathom the meaning of an imaginative or a constitutive work, ar-
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tistic or legal, as a whole or in its parts, it is necessary to know not 
only the thought at the time of its creation but also what we have 
become and what we aspire to be. 
Look more closely at the problematic provisions of the Con-
stitution. What are we to make of such cardinal provisions as 
"commerce among the several states," "establishment of religion," 
"an impartial jury," "privileges and immunities of citizens," 
"freedom of speech and of the press"? Consider specifically the 
last-mentioned clause, contained in the first amendment. What is 
its "meaning"? To take an actual recent issue, does it protect a 
newspaper which has printed a false and defamatory statement 
about a private citizen in the context of reporting an event of pub-
lic interest and concern? 
The first thing a humanist will notice is that I have not prop-
erly stated the constitutional provision whose meaning is to be ex-
amined, or the other constitutional provisions in the preceding 
paragraph. There is no positive error in the quotations; what is 
amiss is the isolation of the phrase from the statement in which it 
is a term. The "meaning" we seek is the meaning of a statement, 
not of a word. In the case of the first amendment this could make 
a significant difference. The statement runs: "Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech or of the 
press." The absoluteness of the language of immunity raises obvi-
ous difficulties in such contexts as verbal incitement to violence, 
false advertising, and deliberate defamation of character. The ab-
soluteness might have been a tolerable reading in a legal regime 
where these forms of verbal offenses remained redressible under 
the laws of the several states; the gloss of federalism would thus 
have helped to define the terms. When the fourteenth amend-
ment, adopted in 1868, guaranteed "life, liberty, and property" 
against deprivation by the states without due process of law, it was 
still open to the Supreme Court to read this more general provi-
sion as affording more latitude to the states to deal with these of-
fenses than the first amendment permitted to the national 
government. The Court, however, did not take this line, and so 
we are faced with language forbidding both national and state 
controls on expression. 
But categorical imperatives invite a search for escape routes. 
One is suggested by Justice Holmes's counsel on ascertaining the 
meaning of constitutional provisions: "Their significance is vital 
not formal; it is to be gathered not simply by taking the words and 
a dictionary, but by considering their origin and the line of their 
growth." For Holmes, history was a liberating force: "The ra-
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tional study of law is still to a large extent the study of history . . . 
because it is the first step toward an enlightened scepticism." 
When you draw the dragon out of his cave, Holmes said, you can 
examine his teeth and claws to test his strength; the next step is to 
kill him or tame him and make him a useful animal. 
If we first examine the teeth and claws of the first amendment 
in the light of history, we find that the protection that libertarians 
of the time sought for the press was a safeguard against prior cen-
sorship, and an assurance of a full trial by jury in prosecutions for 
libel. That rather modest definition of freedom of the press would 
leave the press exposed to the risk of limitless civil and criminal 
liability for honestly believed but mistaken libelous statements in 
a political context. The first amendment would tum out to be not 
even a tamed lion, but a meek pussycat, out of reach for example, 
of the Sedition Act of 1798. In the end, the Court has read the 
first amendment to protect the press against liability for defama-
tion of private citizens where the misstatement was neither wilful 
nor negligent, and where negligent to allow only actual damages 
to be recovered. 
Was this judgment unfaithful to the "meaning" of "freedom 
of the press"? The humanist will appreciate how treacherous is 
the form of the question. If denotative meaning is called for, the 
decision went beyond the probable instances to which the framers 
were attending in their concern for freedom of the press. But if 
purposive or connotative meaning is wanted, the decision is not 
precluded by the constitutional language, and is faithful to the 
framers' central design, to secure an independent and vigilant 
press as a check on the conduct of public affairs. History is not 
thereby betrayed or disregarded; affording a vital insight into con-
stitutional meaning, it is seen as comprehending relevant experi-
ence and philosophical thought. It is no accident that a scholar 
bred in the Continental tradition sought to characterize John 
Rawls's A Theory of Justice as "just American constitutional law." 
Whatever may be the degree of mental "toughness" needed 
for the hard and the soft sciences, humanists and lawyers require 
minds at once capacious, rigorous, and empathetic. Like the his-
torian or the literary critic entering into an epoch or a work or art, 
the lawyer entering into a set of facts or a regulatory plan must be 
prepared to engage and disengage: to immerse himself, lest he 
become abstract and unfeeling, to detach himself, lest he become 
bemused and sentimental. A constitutional lawyer or judge strug-
gling with the claims of the absolute may think of Ibsen, cham-
pioning those moral claims in An Enemy of the People and The 
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Master Builder, and countering with the life-sustaining illusion in 
The Wild Duck. Or wrestling with the claims of the individual 
conscience against the impersonal rule of law, he may reflect on 
Billy Budd and so come full circle in his thinking, for that great 
work was inspired, it has been suggested, by the predicament of 
Melville's father-in-law, Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of Massachu-
setts, in having to decide cases prosecuted under the Fugitive 
Slave Law. Faced with an unsatisfying pattern of precedents, a 
judge worrying whether to tinker further or to make a new begin-
ning may recall Duhem's theorem in the philosophy of science, 
that every experiment tests in principle not only the particular ele-
ment under observation but the structure of antecedent premises 
upon which the experiment rests. 
Amid the delights and creative constraints of form, the hu-
manist is tormented, as is the constitutional lawyer, by questions 
of meaning, value, and judgment. Intensive practice with those 
questions is more important as preparation for the study of law 
than the command of a particular subject, as in judging a prospec-
tive nominee for the bench it is more important to see the books in 
his library than to look at a list of clients in his office. In law, too, 
if you would carry back the wealth of the Indies you must bring 
the wealth of the Indies with you. 
